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Sufficiency of quantum non-Gaussianity for discrete-variable quantum key distribution over noisy
channels
Mikołaj Lasota,∗ Radim Filip,† and Vladyslav C. Usenko‡
Department of Optics, Palacky´ University, 17. listopadu 1192/12, 77146 Olomouc, Czech Republic
Quantum key distribution can be enhanced and extended if nonclassical single-photon states of light are used.
We study a connection between the security of quantum key distribution and quantum non-Gaussianity of light
arriving at the receiver’s detection system after the propagation through a noisy quantum channel, being under
full control of an eavesdropper performing general collective attacks. We show that while quantum nonclas-
sicality exhibited by the light arriving at the receiver’s station is a necessary indication of the security of the
discrete-variable protocols, quantum non-Gaussianity can be a sufficient indication of their security. Therefore,
checking for non-Gaussianity of this light by performing standard autocorrelation function measurement can be
used for prior verification of the usability of prepare-and-measure schemes. It can play similar role to the prior
verification of the quantum correlations sufficient to violate Bell inequalities for entanglement-based protocols.
PACS numbers: 42.50.Ar, 42.50.Dv, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex
Keywords: quantum key distribution; quantum cryptography; discrete variables; single-photon states; quantum nonclassical-
ity; quantum non-Gaussianity; photon statistics; quantum state measurement
I. INTRODUCTION
During more than thirty years since the invention of the
famous BB84 protocol [1] many different discrete-variable
quantum key distribution (DV QKD) schemes, utilizing sin-
gle photons to generate secure keys between their legitimate
participants (traditionally called Alice and Bob), have been
both proposed theoretically [2–7] and realized experimen-
tally [8–10]. Comprehensive reviews of this field can be
found in [11, 12]. Although in theory QKD protocols provide
one with unconditionally secure way of exchanging informa-
tion [13, 14], in realistic situations their security is typically
strongly limited due to various imperfections of the currently
available laboratory equipment which can be used for the im-
plementation of these schemes [15–17]. The most crucial is-
sues for DV QKD protocols in this context are non-zero prob-
ability of emitting multiphoton pulses, losses of photons dur-
ing their propagation between Alice and Bob and errors gen-
erated in Bob’s detection system [16]. Usually the primary
source of these errors are dark counts, which are randomly
generated from time to time in all types of realistic single-
photon detectors [18]. However they can be caused also by
a few other reasons, e.g.by the disturbance of photons sent
from Alice’s source during their propagation to Bob [19] or
by coupling the real signals to noise photons generated by the
external sources of light, independent from the legitimate par-
ticipants of a given QKD protocol [20]. In particular, channel
noise can arise in the dense wavelength-division multiplexing
channels due to the crosstalk with strong classical signals or
Raman scattering [21].
In general, the aforementioned problems with the setup in
real-life scenario may allow a potential eavesdropper (Eve) to
hide errors made by her own efforts to gain knowledge on the
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key created by Alice and Bob, masking them as naturally oc-
curring errors, or to perform more dangerous types of attacks,
e.g.photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks [16], which can be
error-free. Thus, in realistic situation in order to preserve at
least limited ability to produce a secure key by a given QKD
scheme Alice and Bob have to be able to somehow monitor
the quality of this key.
The most basic way to do so is to check the fraction of
pulses causing a click in Bob’s detection system and the frac-
tion of errors among all his measurement results and com-
pare them with their respective expected values, which can
be calculated by Alice and Bob basing on the parameters of
their setup. The possibility for them to perform such a task
during the key generation process imposes some constraints
on Eve’s activities because she has to make sure that the ex-
pected values of these two quantities will be indeed recreated.
Otherwise the legitimate participants of a given QKD protocol
would immediately get suspicious of Eve’s presence and deem
the generated key insecure. The limitations on the eavesdrop-
per’s actions may be even greater if Alice and Bob use the so-
called decoy-pulsemethod [4, 22] during the QKD process. In
this case, while Alice randomly changes the intensity of light
emitted by her realistic source, Bob checks fractions of pulses
causing a click in his detection system and fractions of errors
among all his measurement results for each of the different in-
tensities separately. In the most favorable situation, from the
point of view of Alice and Bob, decoy-pulse method may to-
tally prevent Eve from manipulating the statistics of photons
reaching Bob, which she could otherwise safely do e.g.by
sending some of them through a lossless quantum channel and
blocking the others.
Another useful way for monitoring the security of a given
QKD scheme, based on checking of the violation of Bell in-
equalities, can be applied by Alice and Bob in the case of the
so-called entanglement-based protocols [2, 6, 9]. In this situ-
ation a central source of light, independent from the trusted
parties, produces entangled pairs of photons. One photon
from each of these pairs is subsequently sent to Alice, while
the other one is sent to Bob. Due to the quantum correla-
2tions between the two parts of a given entangled state, the
results of the measurements performed by Alice and Bob on
their respective parts of the state are correlated with each
other. A good way to monitor such correlations (and thus the
quality of the generated key) is to check if these results vio-
late Bell inequalities and by how much they do so. Such an
idea for a priori verifying suitability of a given entanglement-
based DV QKD protocol for secure quantum communica-
tion was proposed by Ekert in 1991 along with his famous
E91 protocol [2] and later became the essential part of the
so-called device-independent (DI) [5, 23] and measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD schemes [7, 10, 24].
Although DI and MDI QKD protocols allow Alice and Bob
to release assumptions about trusted nature of their devices,
their implementation is quite challenging due to the neces-
sity of performing long-distance single-photon interference,
which remains a demanding task even in the laboratory. Due
to this limitation, the conventional prepare-and-measureQKD
protocols, utilizing single photons sent from Alice to Bob, re-
main more suitable for practical implementations. In this case
the verification whether the resource of security is preserved
after the channel can be made by monitoring quantum features
of photons arriving at Bob’s detection system. It can be done
by performing the measurement of the so-called autocorrela-
tion function. This procedure has been used for a long time as
a useful tool for checking the property of quantum nonclassi-
cality [25] and, very recently, quantum non-Gaussianity [26]
of realistic single-photon states. The latter one of these two
properties excludes every possibility to describe experimental
data using any mixture of Gaussian states [27]. It represents
a higher threshold for nonclassical features of light, which is
much challenging to overcome. Simultaneously, it is very ro-
bust as has been predicted and experimentally verified for re-
alistic single photon sources [28, 29].
In this paper we compare quantum nonclassicality and non-
Gaussianity criteria with security conditions for DVQKD pro-
tocols over noisy quantum channels. It is well known, that
while QKD systems can in principle tolerate any amount of
loss in the quantum channel, the noise present in the channel
limits the performance and secure distance of the protocols.
In order to study security of DV QKD in the noisy channels
and compare it to the quantum non-Gaussianity and nonclassi-
cality criteria, we introduce three typical physical realizations
of channel noise, which differ by the noise statistics and cou-
pling to the signal. A similar approach was recently used to
model a quantum channel in the study of microwave quan-
tum communication [30]. However, we assume that an eaves-
dropper is able to purify the channel noise, i.e. has the quan-
tum channel under full control, and is able to perform optimal
collective attacks. Without the loss of generality we perform
our investigations for the case of Alice and Bob using BB84
protocol [1] based on polarization encoding. The results of
our analysis show that nonclassicality of light reaching Bob’s
measurement system can be always treated as a necessary in-
dication of further QKD security in each of the studied cases.
On the other hand, non-Gaussianity of this light becomes a
sufficient and simple indication of possible further QKD se-
curity in the case when the probability of registering a signal
photon by Bob is small but considerably larger than the proba-
bility of registering a dark count in modern realistic detectors.
Moreover it is also sufficient for the schemes with arbitrar-
ily high photon production and transmission efficiency if the
polarization of the signal photons is not being disturbed dur-
ing their propagation between the legitimate participants of a
QKD protocol. On the other hand, if such a disturbance may
occur the probability for Bob to register an error during his
polarization measurement of a signal state influences both the
maximal and the minimal transmittance of the quantum chan-
nel above and below which non-Gaussianity of light arriving
at Bob’s detection system stops being a relevant indication of
possible QKD security. In any case, the actual security of a
QKD protocol can be verified only upon full implementation
of the protocol, while non-Gaussianity is suggested only as a
relevant and sufficient pre-check whether a particular set-up
including a noisy quantum channel can in principle be used
for QKD.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we briefly dis-
cuss how the security of BB84 protocol can be evaluated in
realistic cases and introduce some recently found criteria for
nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity of light emitted by realis-
tic single-photon sources. Next, in Sec. III we give a detailed
description of all the physical realizations of noisy channels
that we consider by introducing three specific DV QKD mod-
els. Then we apply the general formulas introduced in Sec. II
to find the three aforementioned types of criteria for all the
models in various situations. The derivation of analytical ver-
sions of these criteria and the expressions for the minimal se-
cure value of the transmittance of the channel connecting Al-
ice and Bob in each of these cases can be found in Sec. IV.
Finally, in Sec.V we summarize our work.
II. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND FORMULAS
A. QKD security
In order to assess the security of all the models for the DV
QKD schemes considered in this paper, we focus on finding
lower bounds on the quantity called secret fraction [12], which
describes the amount of common secret key that can be dis-
tilled by Alice and Bob from their individual versions of the
raw key through the procedures of error correction and privacy
amplification, per one bit of the raw key. Using the quantum
generalization of Csisza´r-Ko¨rner theorem [31], this bound can
be calculated by using the following formula [32]:
∆I = max[0, IAB −min {IEA, IEB}], (1)
where IAB is the mutual information between Alice’s and
Bob’s raw keys and IEA (IEB) represent the upper bound on
the amount of information Eve can get on Alice’s (Bob’s) ver-
sion of the raw key thanks to her attacks.
If Alice’s source emits only genuine single-photon pulses,
Eve can maximize her information by performing general col-
lective attacks on them. For BB84 protocol the amount of in-
formation she can get in this way can be upper-bounded by
3IEA = IEB = H(Q) [14], where H(Q) is Shannon entropy
andQ represents the so-called quantum bit error rate (QBER)
estimated by Alice and Bob in the raw key. On the other hand,
in more realistic situation when Alice’s source emits also mul-
tiphoton pulses with nonzero probability, Eve’s best strategy
is to: i) perform so-called photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tacks on all multiphoton pulses – which in the case of BB84
protocol can give her all the information encoded in them, ii)
make sure that Bob registers all of these pulses by forward-
ing them to him through some lossless quantum channel and
iii) perform general collective attacks on such an amount of
single-photon pulses, which is required for Eve to recreate the
expected level of QBER in Bob’s version of the key. If the
number of pulses Eve is able to attack using this strategy is
lower than the amount of clicks expected by Bob in his detec-
tion system during the whole key generation process, she also
has to forward to him some of the remaining single-photon
pulses without attacking them. The rest of the pulses may be
blocked by her.
As we have already stated in the introduction to this arti-
cle, the possibility of applying this kind of strategy by Eve
may be restricted by Alice and Bob if they use decoy-pulse
method. However, we do not consider this method in our
work. It would be useless in the cases of DV QKD models
introduced in Sec. III A and III B since both of them assume
that Alice’s source never emits multiphoton pulses. On the
other hand applying decoy-pulse method to the model ana-
lyzed in Sec. III C would simply reduce this scheme to the one
analyzed in Sec. III A (in the best case scenario of infinitely
many decoy intensities used by Alice). We also do not con-
sider here the so-called preprocessing procedure [14], which
could be utilized by Alice and Bob to increase the security of
the key by deliberately adding some noise to it. This proce-
dure would not affect the results of our analysis in significant
way and would not change the general conclusions which can
be derived from them.
In the situation when decoy-pulse method and the prepro-
cessing procedure are not used by the trusted parties, the mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob on the generated key
can be written as IAB = 1 −H(Q) and the lower bound for
∆I can be expressed as [17]
∆I = max
[
0, y −H(Q)− yH
(
Q
y
)]
, (2)
where y is the fraction of genuine single-photon pulses among
all the pulses registered by Bob’s detectors. In the case when
Alice’s source never emits multiphoton pulses, the above ex-
pression obviously simplifies to
∆I = max [0, 1− 2H(Q)] . (3)
B. Nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity measurements
In what follows we compare the requirements for QKD
security, calculated according to the general formula dis-
cussed above, with the criteria for nonclassicality and non-
Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s detection system. In
Bob
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of single photons
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FIG. 1. (color online) A setup for the detection of nonclassicality and
non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s station, applied for all of
the DV QKD models introduced in Sec. III.
order to find such criteria for the DV QKD models introduced
further in Sec. III we assume that in the case of every par-
ticular model Bob can switch his QKD detection system to
the standard setup for autocorrelation function measurement,
consisting of 50:50 beam-splitter and two single-photon de-
tectors, pictured in Fig. 1. The rest of a given QKD setup, i.e.
Alice’s source and the quantum channel along with any pos-
sible external sources of noise, coupling to the signal during
its propagation from Alice to Bob, can be treated by him as
an imperfect source of single photons. We focus on analyzing
the situation in which Bob uses ideal on-off binary detectors
with unity efficiency and no dark counts for his verification of
nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity of the incomning light.
Thanks to this assumption it is possible to check how QKD
security can be related to the genuine nonclassicality and non-
Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s station, undisturbed by
any potential imperfections in the process of autocorrelation
function measurement. However, in the Appendix A we also
briefly discuss more practical scenario, in which Bob utilizes
exactly the same realistic single-photon detectors with non-
zero dark count probability for the generation of secure key
and for the verification of nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity
of light arriving at his station.
In our study we use the results of the analysis of nonclas-
sicality and non-Gaussianity of light emitted by an imperfect
source of single photons performed in [28]. According to this
paper, if we denote the probability of registering a single de-
tection event in one of the detectors pictured in Fig. 1 by PS
and the probability of a coincidence of detection events byPC ,
the boundary for nonclassicality of light emitted by a given
source can be found by solving the equation
PS = 2
(√
PC − PC
)
. (4)
Finding a similar analytical expression for the non-
Gaussianity boundary turns out to be impossible, but for a
given value of PS the maximal value of PC for which light
emitted from a particular source is non-Gaussian can be found
by numerically solving the following pair of equations


1− PS2 − PC = 4
√
V exp[−n/(6+2V )]√
(3V+1)(3+V )
1− PS − PC = 2
√
V exp[−n/(2+2V )]
V+1
, (5)
4where
n =
(1 − V 2)(V + 3)
V (3V + 1)
(6)
and maximizing the solution for PC on V ∈ (0, 1). Quan-
tum non-Gaussianity threshold given by (5) represents much
more strict condition for realistic single photon states [26]
than quantum nonclassicality threshold (4). This relation be
seen e.g. in the fact that attenuation of a quantum channel does
not break nonclassicality of light emitted by realistic single
photon sources, contrary to its non-Gaussianity [29].
As we will see in Sec. III, by measuring non-Gaussianity
of light arriving at Bob’s station in the way described in
the previous paragraph, the legitimate participants of a given
DV QKD protocol may be able to verify suitability of their
prepare-and-measure type of the scheme for the generation of
secure cryptographic key. It is worth noting here that since the
polarization of the photons sent by Alice does not have any
effect on the results of autocorrelation function measurement
performed by Bob, this verification can be done at any stage
of the protocol. Furthermore, Bob does not have to inform
Alice about the precise time in which he decides to switch his
measurement setup to the one presented in Fig. 1. Thus Eve
is also unable to get such information. This means that she
cannot mislead Alice and Bob by acting differently during the
stages of non-Gaussianity verification and key generation.
III. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC DV QKD MODELS
In our study we assume that Eve is able to perform general
collective attacks in a noisy channel, which is fully under her
control. However, the statistics of noise and its coupling to
the signal may differ. Therefore, in this section we introduce
and analyze three specific physical realizations of the noisy
channels. In all the three cases we assume first of all that the
polarization detection system used by Bob always consists of
a single polarization beam-splitter and two binary on-off de-
tectors with perfect detection efficiency and dark count proba-
bility per gate d≪ 1. Secondly, for every one of the analyzed
schemes we consider the possibility of rotating the polariza-
tion of a given signal photon during its propagation fromAlice
to Bob. It is modelled by applying the following transforma-
tion to the state |ψ〉 emitted by Alice:
|ψ〉〈ψ| → (1− e)|ψ〉〈ψ|+ e 1ˆ
2
. (7)
This kind of the so-called depolarizing channel represents the
influence of a completely unpolarized polarization noise and
is typically the most detrimental polarization quantum chan-
nel. Therefore, we are clearly describing the worst case sce-
nario here. If a given polarization channel is different in real-
ity, an improvement can be realized. Further we describe and
analyze each of the DV QKD models in details.
Alice Bobquantumchannel (Eve)
depolarizing
channel
FIG. 2. (color online) The model for realistic DV QKD scheme with
signal coupling to the channel noise in the form of the thermal bath.
A. Model with thermal bath
The model for the DV QKD scheme with the signal cou-
pling to the noise in the form of the thermal bath inside the
quantum channel, typical for continuous-variable quantum
communication [33], is presented in Fig. 2. In this configu-
ration we assume that Alice’s source never emits multiphoton
pulses. It sends to Bob only one-photon and empty pulses
with probabilities p and 1 − p respectively. The multimode
channel connecting Alice and Bob is both lossy and noisy, and
we describe its influence on a given signal state by coupling
it to a thermal bath on a beam-splitter with transmittance T .
This situation can be properly modeled by replacing the afore-
mentioned channel by two single-mode channels transmitting
orthogonal polarization modes, to which two independent and
identically distributed sources of noise photons are being cou-
pled, with the same polarizations respectively. We assume
here that the statistics of photons generated by these sources
are thermal, with mean numbers of photons emitted per pulse
given by µ. We denote the probability of generating n noise
photons by them in a single pulse by pn(µ).
According to the formula (3), in order to assess the security
of the QKD scheme presented in Fig. 2, we need to express
QBER in terms of the parameters describing the setup. Be-
fore we do this, it is useful to realize that since this configura-
tion is totally symmetric in polarizations, it is not necessary
to consider separately all of the cases when Alice’s source
sends differently polarized signal photons to Bob. It is suf-
ficient to consider only a single case in which the polarization
chosen by Alice and the detector to which the signal photon
should go if Bob chose the right basis for his measurement
are both called right, while the opposite polarization and the
other detector are called wrong. Now by p+(k, l) let us denote
the probability that the signal photon will be emitted by Alice
and successfully transmitted through the channel into one of
Bob’s detectors and at the same time k noise photons will ar-
rive at the right detector, while l noise photons will arrive at
the wrong detector. Similarly, by p−(k, l) we will denote the
probability that the signal photon will not reach Bob’s detec-
tion system in a given attempt but nevertheless k and l noise
photons will arrive at the right and wrong detectors respec-
5tively. These two quantities are equal to
p+(k, l) = pTpik(T )pil(T ) (8)
and
p−(k, l) = (1− pT )pik(T )pil(T ), (9)
where
pik(T ) =
∞∑
n=k
pn(µ)
(
n
k
)
(1 − T )kT n−k. (10)
We assume here that Bob’s detectors are not capable of re-
solving the number of incoming photons, so Alice and Bob
automatically have to accept every event in which exactly one
of these detectors clicks, no matter howmany photons actually
reached it. Since from (8) and (9) we have p±(k, l) = p±(l, k)
the expected probability of accepting a given event by Alice
and Bob can be expressed as
p(I)exp =
∞∑
k=0
p+(k, 0) + 2
∞∑
k=1
p−(k, 0) + 2dp−(0, 0). (11)
An error in Bob’s version of the key appears in the follow-
ing cases: i) with probability e/2 – when the signal photon
survives the transmission through the channel and the noise
photons arrive only at the same detector as the signal photon,
ii) with 50% probability – when the only surviving photons
are the noise photons traveling into one of the detectors and
iii) with 50% probability – when there are no real photons ar-
riving at the detectors and the click in one of them is caused
by a dark count. This means that QBER expected by Alice
and Bob is given by
Q(I) =
e
2
∑∞
k=0 p+(k, 0) +
∑∞
k=1 p−(k, 0) + dp−(0, 0)
p
(I)
exp
.
(12)
Having the formula for QBER derived above, we now
check the security of the scheme illustrated in Fig. 2 for dif-
ferent values of setup parameters. However, if we also want
to compare the security criterion with the criteria for nonclas-
sicality and non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s side,
we need to find similar expressions for PS and PC , defined
in Sec. II.B, in the situation when Bob’s detection system in
Fig. 2 is replaced by the standard setup for the autocorrelation
function measurement, pictured in Fig. 1. Assuming that the
detectors in this setup are perfect, these two quantities can be
expressed in terms of probabilities p±(k, l) as follows:
P
(I)
S =
∞∑
k,l=0
p+(k, l) + 2p−(k, l)
2k+l
− 2p−(0, 0), (13)
P
(I)
C = 1− P (I)S − p−(0, 0). (14)
In Fig. 3 we show the dependency of the maximal power of
the source of noise allowing for the generation of secure cryp-
tographic key on the transmittance of the channel connecting
FIG. 3. (color online) Comparison between the lower bounds for
the security of BB84 protocol realized using the scheme presented in
Fig. 2 for a) p = 1 and b) p = 0.01 for two different values of the
parameter e: e = 0 (solid lines) and e = 0.05 (dot-dashed lines),
calculated numerically for the cases of d = 0 (red, uppermost lines),
d = 10−5 (green, middlemost lines) and d = 10−3 (blue, low-
ermost lines). The calculations were performed using the formula
(3), with Q given by the expression (12). With black (upper) and
brown (lower) dashed lines respectively we denoted the correspond-
ing nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria for the light arriving
at Bob’s detection system, calculated according to the equations (4)
and (5), with the quantities PS and PC given by the expressions (13)
and (14).
Alice and Bob, calculated numerically for a few different val-
ues of the parameters d, e and p in the case of the QKD model
analyzed above. In the same figure we also compare these se-
curity criteria with the similar criteria for nonclassicality and
non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s detection system.
From this picture we can conclude that when d ≪ pT ≪ 1
non-Gaussianity criterion appears to be a sufficient indication
of further QKD security for every realistic value of e. It means
that once a quantum channel complies with the considered
noise model, the observation of non-Gaussianity at the re-
ceiver station is fully sufficient for successful implementation
of DV QKD protocol if only the error parameters d and e are
negligibly small. Importantly, this conclusion remains valid
for any 0 < p ≤ 1. Therefore, the indicator is a relevant par-
tial sufficient security condition addressing output quantum
statistics of single-mode light. It is very different to the quan-
tum nonclassicality of light, which can be seen only as a nec-
6Alice Bobquantumchannel (Eve)
depolarizing
channel
FIG. 4. (color online) The model for realistic DV QKD scheme with
noise generated by an external source of light coupling to the signal
before the quantum channel.
essary indicator of potential possibility to achieve the security
(see Fig. 3). However, the security of a particular realization
of the DV QKD protocol can not be fully proven merely by
the observation of non-Gaussianity. It can be verified only by
estimating all the relevant parameters of the protocol, which
define its security (i.e. the level of QBER in the considered
case).
B. Model with noise coupling to the signal before the quantum
channel
The model for DV QKD scheme with noise coupling to the
signal before the quantum channel is presented in Fig. 4. Here
our assumptions on the signal source owned by Alice are ex-
actly the same as for the model with thermal bath analyzed
previously and the channel connecting Alice and Bob is once
again lossy with transmittance T . The difference between the
schemes illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 lies in the type of noise,
coming from the external source of light (independent from
Alice and Bob), which is added to the signal during its propa-
gation between the trusted parties. This time the noise photons
couple to the signal before the channel, meaning that they are
being attenuated inside of it in the same way as the photons
carrying the information about the key. Our basic assumption
here is that the probability distribution pn(µ) of the number
of photons generated by the source of noise per pulse is of
the thermal type. However, for comparison in the Appendix
B we also consider the situation when it is given by Poisson
statistics. Furthermore, we assume here that all of the noise
photons in a given pulse are emitted in the same polarization
state |ψ〉, which is a random superposition of the signal state
|A〉 sent by Alice, to which this particular noise photons are
coupled, and the state |A⊥〉 which is orhogonal to it. In other
words
|ψ〉 = √x|A〉+ eiφ√1− x|A⊥〉, (15)
where x can take all the values between 0 and 1 with uni-
formly distributed probability and φ ∈ [0, 2pi).
Since in the case of Alice and Bob using DV QKD scheme
presented in Fig. 4 we again assume that all the double clicks
in Bob’s detection system are discarded from the key automat-
ically, an important quantity for our security analysis of this
setup configuration is the probability that all of the photons
belonging to a particular j-photon noise pulse would go to the
same detector. For photons in a given state of the form (15)
this probability can be calculated as
f(x) = xj + (1− x)j . (16)
It can be shown that the mean value of this quantity, random-
ized over every possible value of x is equal to 2/(j + 1).
To assess the security of the scheme presented in Fig. 4, we
again use the formula (3). In order to express the value of
QBER in terms of the parameters describing this setup con-
figuration let us denote the probability that only the signal
photon (the noise photons) would arrive at Bob’s measure-
ment system and cause a click in one of his detectors by psexp
(pnexp). Furthermore we use p
n,s
exp to describe the probability
that both signal photon and at least one noise photon reach
Bob’s measurement system and cause a single click in one of
his detectors, and pdcexp for the case when no real photons man-
age to get through the quantum channel but there is a click on
Bob’s side in the form of a dark count. These four quantities
can be calculated in the following way:
psexp = pT
∞∑
i=0
pi(µ)(1 − T )i, (17)
pnexp = 2(1− pT )
∞∑
i=1
pi(µ)ri(T ), (18)
pn,sexp = pT
∞∑
i=1
pi(µ)ri(T ) (19)
and
pdcexp = 2d(1− pT )
∞∑
i=0
pi(µ)(1 − T )i, (20)
where
ri(T ) =
i∑
j=1
(
i
j
)
T j(1− T )i−j
j + 1
(21)
is the probability that an i-photon pulse emitted by the source
of noise will be successfully transmitted to Bob’s detection
system and all of the surviving photons from this pulse will
go to the same detector. By using the above quantities QBER
can be expressed in the following way:
Q(II) =
e
(
psexp + p
n,s
exp
)
+ pnexp + p
dc
exp
2p
(II)
exp
, (22)
where
p(II)exp = p
s
exp + p
n,s
exp + p
n
exp + p
dc
exp. (23)
On the other hand, the probabilities PS and PC , needed for
the calculation of nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria
for light arriving at Bob’s side, can be written as
P
(II)
S = p
s
exp + p˜
n,s
exp + p˜
n
exp, (24)
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P
(II)
C = 1− P (II)S − (1− pT )
∞∑
i=0
pi(µ)(1− T )i (25)
where
p˜nexp = 2(1− pT )
∞∑
i=1
pi(µ)si(T ), (26)
p˜n,sexp = pT
∞∑
i=1
pi(µ)si(T ) (27)
and
si(T ) =
i∑
j=1
(
i
j
)
T j(1− T )i−j
2j
(28)
is the probability that at least one out of i photons emitted by
the source of noise in a given pulse would survive its travel
through the quantum channel and cause a click in a particular
one of the two Bob’s detectors in the detection system for the
measurement of autocorrelation function, illustrated in Fig. 1.
The dependency of the maximal power of the source of
noise, for which it is possible to utilize the setup illustrated
in Fig. 4 to generate secure cryptographic key by using BB84
protocol, on the transmittance of the channel connecting Alice
and Bob, calculated numerically for a couple of values of d, e
and p for the thermal type of statistics of the source of noise,
is presented in Fig. 5. The resulting QKD security criteria are
also compared there with the criteria for nonclassicality and
non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s detection system.
The conclusions concerning the relationships between these
different types of criteria that can be derived here are analo-
gous to the ones regarding the model for the DV QKD scheme
presented in Fig. 3, stated in the previous section. Nonclassi-
cality of light arriving at Bob’s detection system can be once
again treated as a necessary indication of further QKD secu-
rity in every realistic situation, while fulfillment of the non-
Gaussianity criterion turns out to be sufficient for the security
in most of the cases. It may be not sufficient only i) when the
values of p and T are relatively high and e > 0 at the same
time or ii) when the probability of registering a real signal in
Bob’s measurement system is not much larger than the prob-
ability of registering a dark count. This remarkable similarity
of the results of our analyses performed for the models illus-
trated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 suggests that the conclusions stated
here may apply to every type of DVQKD scheme with perfect
single-photon source and noisy quantum channel, regardless
of the type of this noise.
C. Model with thermal bath and SPDC-based signal source
While the DV QKD schemes analyzed in the subsections
III A and III B deal with two different kinds of channel noise,
both of them contain the same idealized model of the source
FIG. 5. (color online) Comparison between the lower bounds for
the security of BB84 protocol realized using the scheme presented in
Fig. 4 and nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria for light arriv-
ing at Bob’s side in this case, found in the situation when the source
of noise has thermal statistics of the number of photons emitted per
pulse. The calculations of QKD security were performed using the
formula (3), with Q given by the expression (22). The nonclassi-
cality and non-Gaussianity criteria were calculated according to the
equations (4) and (5), with the quantities PS and PC given by the
expressions (24) and (25) respectively. The styles and colors of all
the lines are exactly the same as in Fig. 3.
of photons used by Alice. It is therefore reasonable to con-
sider the influence of the possibility of generating multipho-
ton pulses by a more realistic signal source on the results pre-
sented in the previous subsections. In order to study this issue
we once again consider the scheme illustrated in Fig. 2, but
with a substantial modification of Alice’s part of the setup,
presented in Fig. 6. As can be seen in this figure, we assume
here that Alice owns heralded single-photon source based
on the spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) pro-
cess. In this type of source one photon from each pair cre-
ated inside a nonlinear crystal, called idler, is always sent
to a heralding detector, while the other one, called signal, is
used to transmit the information about the key, but only if the
heralding detector clicks. The photons for DV QKD applica-
tions are typically produced by a multimode SPDC process.
In this case the probabilities of generating different numbers
of photon pairs per one pulse of the pump laser can be approx-
imated by the Poisson statistics [34]. If we denote the mean
number of these pairs by ν, we can express the state produced
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FIG. 6. (color online) The change of Alice’s setup which should be
made in the QKD schemes illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 in order to
perform their security analyses in the case when the key is being gen-
erated using realistic single-photon source based on SPDC process.
in the crystal as
ρˆ =
∞∑
n=0
e−ν
νn
n!
|n〉S〈n| ⊗ |n〉I〈n|, (29)
where the subscripts S and I denote the Fock states belonging
to the Hilbert spaces of signal and idler photons respectively.
After emerging from the crystal idler photons are directed
to the heralding detector. For simplicity we assume here that
this device is ideal. It means that it never registers dark counts
and successfully heralds any non-empty signal pulse emitted
by Alice’s source. Thus, its action on the state ρˆ can be ex-
pressed by the operator
Pˆherald = 1ˆI − |0〉I〈0| (30)
and the probability that an i-photon signal pulse will be gener-
ated during the SPDC process and subsequently accepted for
the QKD reads
qi(ν) = S〈i|TrI
[
1ˆS ⊗ Pˆheraldρˆ
]
|i〉S. (31)
Therefore we have
qi(ν) =
{
0, i = 0
e−ν ν
i
i! , i 6= 0
. (32)
Since Alice’s source utilizing the down-conversion phe-
nomenon emits multiphoton pulses with non-zero probability,
we have to use the formula (2) if we want to properly analyze
the security of the modified thermal bath DV QKD model.
This means that beside QBER, we also have to find the for-
mula for the fraction of clicks y caused by genuine single-
photon pulses among all the clicks registered by Bob. Before
we do this, let us define the following functions:
P+(k, l) =
∞∑
i=0
qi(ν)ti(T )pik(T )pil(T ) (33)
and
P−(k, l) =
∞∑
i=0
qi(ν)(1 − ti(T ))pik(T )pil(T ), (34)
FIG. 7. (color online) Comparison between the numerically calcu-
lated lower bounds for the security of BB84 protocol realized us-
ing the scheme pictured in Fig. 2 with the modification presented in
Fig. 6 and nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria for light ar-
riving at Bob’s side in this particular case. The three panels illus-
trate the plots made for the following values of the parameter ν: a)
ν = 10−1, b) ν = 10−2, c) ν = 10−4. The calculations of QKD
security were performed using the formula (2), with y and Q given
by the expression (36) and (39) respectively. The nonclassicality and
non-Gaussianity criteria were calculated according to the equations
(4) and (5), with the quantities PS and PC given by the expressions
(40) and (41) respectively. The styles and colors of all the lines are
exactly the same as in Fig. 3.
9where the quantity pik(T ) is given by the expression (10) and
ti(T ) denotes the probability that at least one photon emitted
by Alice in a given i-photon signal pulse will survive its travel
to Bob’s measurement system. This probability is equal to
ti(T ) =
i∑
j=1
(
i
j
)
T j(1− T )i−j . (35)
Since in the worst case scenario Eve can forward to Bob all of
the multiphoton pulses via lossless quantum channel, we have
y = max
[
0,
p
(III)
exp − pmulti
p
(III)
exp
]
, (36)
where
p(III)exp =
∞∑
k=0
P+(k, 0) + 2
∞∑
k=1
P−(k, 0) + 2dP−(0, 0) (37)
and
pmulti =
∞∑
i=2
qi(ν). (38)
The QBER produced by the modified thermal bath DV QKD
model can be written as
Q(III) =
e
2
∑∞
k=0 P+(k, 0) +
∑∞
k=1 P−(k, 0) + dP−(0, 0)
p
(III)
exp
.
(39)
On the other hand, the quantities PS and PC , needed for the
evaluation of nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria, are
now equal to
P
(III)
S =
∑∞
i,k,l=0 2
1−k−lqi(ν)ui(T )pik(T )pil(T )∑∞
i=0 qi(ν)
(40)
and
P
(III)
C = 1−P (III)S −
∑∞
i=0 qi(ν)(1 − T )i (pi0(T ))2∑∞
i=0 qi(ν)
, (41)
where
ui(T ) =
i∑
j=max[0,1−k−l]
(
i
j
)
T j(1− T )i−j
2j
. (42)
Utilizing the expressions derived above we numerically
found the criteria for the security of the modified thermal bath
DVQKD scheme considered in the present subsection, and for
nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s
measurement system in this particular case. Our calculations
were performed for a few different values of the parameters
d, e and ν. The resulting µmax(T ) functions are plotted in
Fig. 7. The conclusions that can be derived from this figure
are once again very similar to the ones stated in Sec. III A.
The only substantial difference between the results obtained
in the present analysis and the ones pictured in Fig.3 is the
fact that when the process of key generation is plagued at the
same time by both the channel noise and the multiphoton sig-
nal pulses, there always exist some minimal values of T below
which non-Gaussianity or QKD security cannot be obtained,
even if d = 0. However, as long as e = 0 and d ≪ T the
threshold value of T required for non-Gaussianity of light ar-
riving at Bob’s detection system is approximately equal to the
analogous value for QKD security (or even higher if ν is rela-
tively high at the same time, as can be seen in Fig.7 a)). Thus,
in this situation non-Gaussianity criterion remains the suffi-
cient indication of further QKD security for every T ≪ 1,
similarly as in the model described in Sec. III A.
It should be mentioned here that the results of the analy-
sis presented in Fig. 7 would not change significantly if we
assumed limited efficiency of the heralding detector in our
model for SPDC-based signal source described above. Also
the dark counts which could be registered by this measure-
ment device in realistic situation would not affect our consid-
erations unless a very low-efficient SPDC process was per-
formed, with probability of emitting a non-empty pulse com-
parable with the probability of registering a dark count by the
heralding detector.
IV. ANALYTICAL APPROXIMATIONS OF VARIOUS
CRITERIA
While derivation of simple, analytical formulas for the se-
curity of the DV QKD models studied in this work and the
nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s
detection system is impossible in the general case, it can be
done in some cases when T → 0. Furthermore, for the case
of d 6= 0 it is possible to find approximate expression for the
minimal transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and
Bob for which a given QKD scheme can be secure. In this
section we explain in details how to find the aforementioned
approximations. Their quality can be assessed by analyzing
Fig. 8, where all kinds of criteria calculated numerically for
the DV QKD model with channel noise in the form of thermal
bath, pictured in Fig. 2, are plotted along with their respective
analytical approximations.
A. QKD security criteria
In order to derive analytical formulas for QKD security cri-
teria in the case of T → 0 for the two models analyzed in
Sec. III A and Sec. III B we have to simplify the formulas for
their respective quantum bit error rates under the assumptions
that T ≪ 1 and d = 0 (if d 6= 0 none of the schemes analyzed
in this article is secure in the limit of T → 0), and compare
them with the threshold value of QBER, which for the case of
BB84 protocol is approximately equal to 11% [14]. For the
DV QKD model with thermal bath we find that
Q(I)(T → 0, d = 0) ≈
e
2pT +
µ
µ+1
pT + 2 µµ+1
. (43)
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FIG. 8. (color online) Comparison between the numerically calcu-
lated nonclassicality (dashed black, upper line), and non-Gaussianity
(dashed brown, lower line) criteria and the lower bounds for the se-
curity of BB84 protocol (solid lines) realized by using DV QKD
scheme presented on Fig. 2 for p = 0.5 and e = 0.05 in the cases
of d = 0 (red, uppermost line), d = 10−5 (green, middlemost line)
and d = 10−3 (blue, lowermost line), with the analogous analyti-
cal criteria (corresponding dotted lines) calculated for T → 0 and
d = 0, using formulas (44), (52) and (53). Additionally dot-dashed
green (right) and blue (left) lines denote minimal secure values of
T , analytically calculated for the cases of d = 10−5 and d = 10−3
respectively, using the formula (67). The numerical calculations re-
garding QKD security, nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria
were performed using exactly the same formulas as in the case pre-
sented in Fig.3.
Utilizing this result and noticing that for T ≪ 1 also the
inequality µmax(T ) ≪ 1 is always true, from the equation
Q(I) = Qth it is possible to get the following security crite-
rion
µQKD,Imax (T → 0, d = 0) ≈
p (2Qth − e)
2(1− 2Qth) T. (44)
On the other hand for the DVQKDmodel with noise coupling
to the signal before the lossy quantum channel connecting Al-
ice and Bob, described in Sec. III B, one has
Q(II)(T → 0, d = 0) ≈ (ep+ µ)
2(p+ µ)
. (45)
Thus, the low-transmittance approximation of the function
µQKD,IImax (T ) takes the form
µQKD,IImax (T → 0, d = 0) ≈
p (2Qth − e)
1− 2Qth . (46)
Finally, in the case of the modified thermal bath DV QKD
model with SPDC-based signal source, analyzed in Sec. III C,
derivation of a simple analytical expression for the function
µQKDmax (T ) is possible only with the additional assumptions
that ν ≪ T , which prevents multiphoton pulses to become
a significant fraction of all the pulses registered by Bob dur-
ing the key generation process. The resulting QKD security
criterion reads
µQKD,IIImax (ν ≪ T ≪ 1, d = 0) ≈
(2Qth − e)
2(1− 2Qth)T. (47)
As should be expected, for p = 1 the expressions (44) and (47)
are identical to each other. The reason for this is the fact that
in the limit of ν → 0 the SPDC-based signal source with per-
fect heralding detector becomes an ideal single-photon source
with 100% probability of emitting one photon in a given ac-
cepted signal pulse.
B. Nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria
In order to find approximate versions of the nonclassical-
ity and non-Gaussianity criteria for all three DV QKD models
introduced in Sec. III let us first denote by ω1 (ω2+) the proba-
bility that there will be exactly one (more than one) photon ar-
riving at Bob’s side in a given pulse during the key generation
process. It was shown in [28] that if the condition ω2+ ≪ ω1
is fulfilled, these two quantities can be used to form much
simpler nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity criteria, than the
ones introduced in Sec. II B. These simplified criteria can be
written respectively as
ω21
2
> ω2+ (48)
and
ω31 > ω2+. (49)
In the case of DV QKD model with thermal bath, intro-
duced in Sec. III A, ω1 and ω2+ can be expressed by using the
probabilities p±(k, l), defined by the formulas (8) and (9), as
ω
(I)
1 = p+(0, 0) + 2p−(1, 0) (50)
and
ω
(I)
2+ = 1− ω(I)1 − p−(0, 0). (51)
Since for T ≪ 1 and µ ≪ 1 the relationship ω(I)2+ ≪ ω(I)1 is
fulfilled, the inequalities (48) and (49) can be indeed used to
find the desired criteria in this situation. In the end they can
be written in the following forms:
µNC,Imax (T → 0) ≈
p√
2
T (52)
for nonclassicality of the state reaching Bob’s detection sys-
tem and
µNG,Imax (T → 0) ≈
p2
2
T 2 (53)
for its non-Gaussianity.
To derive the analogous formulas for µNCmax(T → 0) and
µNGmax(T → 0) for the DV QKD model analyzed in Sec. III B
we can once again start with expressing the probabilities ω1
and ω2+ in terms of the parameters describing this particular
scheme. We have
ω
(II)
1 = p
s
exp + (1− pT )
∞∑
i=0
pi(µ)iT (1− T )(i−1) (54)
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and
ω
(II)
2+ = 1− ω(II)1 − (1− pT )
∞∑
i=0
pi(µ)(1 − T )i, (55)
where psexp has already been defined by the formula (17) in
Sec. III B. For T ≪ 1, when the statistics of the source of
noise is thermal, these two quantities simplify to ω
(II)
1 ≈ (p+
µ)T and ω
(II)
2+ ≈ µ(p + µ)T 2. If so, then from the criterion
for nonclassicality (48) we get
µNC,IImax (T → 0) ≈ p. (56)
Since for T → 0 the value of the function µNG,IImax (T ) also
goes to zero (see Fig. 5), we can assume µ ≪ p for the pur-
pose of finding the simplest possible form of non-Gaussianity
criterion for this QKDmodel. In the end it takes the following
form:
µNG,IImax (T → 0) ≈ p2T. (57)
As a side note it is worth mentioning here that if the source of
noise in the scheme pictured in Fig. 4 had Poisson statistics,
for T ≪ 1 one would get ω(II)2+ ≈ µ(p + µ/2)T 2 and the
same formula for ω
(II)
1 as for the case of thermal statistics.
The non-Gaussianity criterion which could be derived in this
situation would be the same as (57), while the criterion for
nonclassicality would take the form p > 0, which is of course
always fulfilled.
In the case of the modified thermal bath QKD model with
SPDC-based signal source, analyzed in Sec. III C, the proba-
bilities ω1 and ω2 are equal to
ω
(III)
1 =
∑∞
i=0 qi(ν)(1 − T )i−1Ωi(T )∑∞
i=0 qi(ν)
(58)
and
ω
(III)
2+ = 1−ω(III)1 −
∑∞
i=0 qi(ν)(1 − T )i (pi0(T ))2∑∞
i=0 qi(ν)
, (59)
where
Ωi(T ) = iT (pi0(T ))
2
+ 2(1− T )pi0(T )pi1(T ). (60)
When the assumptions µ ≪ 1 and ν ≪ T ≪ 1 are fulfilled,
the expressions (58) and (59) simplify to
ω
(III)
1 (µ≪ 1, ν ≪ T ≪ 1) ≈ T + 2µ (61)
and
ω
(III)
2+ (µ≪ 1, ν ≪ T ≪ 1) ≈ 2Tµ+ 3µ2 (62)
respectively. In this case, using the inequalities (50) and (51),
one can derive the following approximate criteria:
µNC,IIImax (ν ≪ T ≪ 1) ≈
T√
2
(63)
for nonclassicality and
µNG,IIImax (ν ≪ T ≪ 1) ≈
T 2
2
(64)
for non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s measurement
system. As could be expected, for p = 1 the analogous criteria
(52) and (53) have the same form as (63) and (64) respectively.
C. Minimal secure transmittance of the channel
In this subsection for every one of the DV QKD models
analyzed in this paper we find an approximate analytical for-
mula for the minimal transmittance of the channel connecting
Alice and Bob (Tmin) for which it is possible to perform se-
cure key generation process using BB84 protocol in the case
when the probability of registering a dark count in Bob’s de-
tection system is non-zero. In order to perform this task for the
schemes described in Sec. III A and Sec. III B we once again
simplify the expressions (12) and (22) for T ≪ 1, like we did
in Sec. IVA, but this time with the assumption that µ≪ d. In
this situation we get
Q(I)(T ≪ 1, µ≪ d) ≈
e
2pT + d
pT + 2d
. (65)
and
Q(II)(T ≪ 1, µ≪ d) = Q(I)(T ≪ 1, µ≪ d). (66)
The desired expression for Tmin(d) can be derived by com-
paring the above result to Qth. In the end one can obtain
T
(I)
min(d) = T
(II)
min (d) ≈
d (1− 2Qth)
p
(
Qth − e2
) , (67)
which for p = 1 and e = 0 becomes identical to the formula
for the minimal secure transmittance of the channel connect-
ing Alice and Bob for the case of DV QKD performed with
the ideal single-photon source, derived previously in [35].
Finding an analogous expression for Tmin for the modi-
fied version of the thermal bath DV QKD model, described in
Sec. III C, is more problematic. Due to the non-zero probabil-
ity of multiphoton signal emission, in order to do this in the
general case one has to derive the solution to the equation
0 = y(T )
[
1−H
(
Q(T )
y(T )
)]
−H (y(T )) , (68)
emerging from the formula (2). However, solving this equa-
tion analytically is usually impossible even with the assump-
tions that T, ν ≪ 1 and µ ≪ d, which simplify the expres-
sions (36) and (39) for the fraction of genuine single photon
pulses among all the pulses registered by Bob and the QBER
to
y(T ≪ 1, ν ≪ 1, µ≪ d) ≈ νT + 2dν −
ν2
2
νT + 2dν
(69)
and
Q(III)(T ≪ 1, ν ≪ 1, µ≪ d) ≈
e
2T + d
T + 2d
(70)
respectively. Nevertheless, derivation of an analytical expres-
sion for the minimal secure transmittance of the channel con-
necting Alice and Bob turns out to be possible in the two ex-
treme situations: when ν ≪ d and when d≪ ν.
In the former one of these two cases, from the assumption
ν ≪ d follows that y ≈ 1 and one can derive the desired
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expression for Tmin just by comparing the formula (70) to
Qth. It reads
T
(III)
min (ν ≪ d) ≈
d (1− 2Qth)(
Qth − e2
) . (71)
On the other hand, when d ≪ ν one can find the minimal
secure transmittance of the channel by solving the equation
yth =
νT − ν22
νT
. (72)
Since QKD security requires y < 1, when d ≪ ν the in-
equality d ≪ T has to be fulfilled simultaneously. If so,
Q(III) ≈ e/2 and yth for the formula (72) can be found nu-
merically from the expression
0 = yth
[
1−H
(
e
2yth
)]
−H
(e
2
)
. (73)
In this situation the final result takes the following form:
T
(III)
min (d≪ ν) ≈
ν
2 (1− yth) . (74)
D. Minimal transmittance of the channel required for
non-Gaussianity
As can be seen in Fig. 7, in the DV QKD model with the
channel noise in the form of thermal bath and SPDC-based
signal source non-Gaussianity of light reaching Bob’s mea-
surement system cannot be provided for every T even when
µ = 0. In order to find the minimal transmittance of the chan-
nel connecting Alice and Bob which would be required to do
this, one should begin by assuming that µ → 0, ν ≪ 1 and
T ≪ 1 and simplifying the expressions (58) and (59) in this
particular situation. They take the following forms:
ω
(III)
1 (µ→ 0, ν ≪ 1, T ≪ 1) ≈ T (75)
and
ω
(III)
2+ (µ→ 0, ν ≪ 1, T ≪ 1) ≈ νT 2/2. (76)
Inserting (75) and (76) to the inequality (49) one can find the
following expression for Tmin needed for non-Gaussianity of
light arriving at Bob’s side:
TNG,IIImin (ν ≪ 1) ≈
ν
2
. (77)
For the case of e = 0 the quantity T
(III)
min (d ≪ ν) given by
the formula (74) equals TNG,IIImin (ν ≪ 1). This fact confirms
our conclusion stated in Sec. III A, that in this situation non-
Gaussianity criterion remains the sufficient indication of fur-
ther QKD security for every T ≪ 1 if only d≪ T .
V. SUMMARY
We analyzed the security of DV QKD protocols over noisy
channels and compared the resulting security criteria with the
criteria for nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity of light reach-
ing Bob’s detectors. To do so we introduced the models for
three possible physical realizations of the noisy channels, as-
suming that an eavesdropper fully controls the channel in each
of these cases and is able to apply general collective attacks
defined by the amount of the introduced errors. Our motiva-
tion has been to derive a sufficient condition for the statistics
of light detected by the receiver, which would verify suitabil-
ity of the link for the DV QKD. Jointly the analyzed models
cover the most important types of imperfections which could
possibly affect the process of key generation in realistic situ-
ations: the dark counts in Bob’s detectors, the possibility for
disturbing the state of signal photon during its propagation
from Alice to Bob, the imperfection of realistic single-photon
sources and two different kinds of channel noise.
We found out that the nonclassicality criterion is a neces-
sary indication of further QKD security in every realistic sit-
uation that we considered. Furthermore, when the probabil-
ity for Bob to register a signal photon is small but still much
higher than the probability of registering a dark count, non-
Gaussianity of light arriving at his measurement system be-
comes a sufficient indication of further security of DV QKD
protocols in the typical noisy quantum channels. In the case
of Bob using modern low-noise single photon detectors the
requirement of low dark count rate can be safely satisfied for
a wide range of distances between the trusted parties. Both
the maximal and the minimal value of the transmittance of the
quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob, between which
non-Gaussianity of light entering Bob’s station automatically
means that a given QKD scheme is secure, depend on the
probability for Bob to register an error during his polarization
measurement of a signal photon.
For the two QKD schemes with the perfect source of signal
states, analyzed in Sec. III A and Sec. III B, the whole region
of parameters T and µ which is secure can be approximately
bounded by two simple analytical expressions: the asymptotic
non-Gaussianity criterion (given by the formula (53) or (57)
– depending on the specific model) and the minimal secure
value of the quantum channel transmittance (given by the for-
mula (67)). It is clearly visible in Fig. 7. The above conclusion
is valid both for the case of channel noise in the form of ther-
mal bath and for the case when the noise couples to the signal
before it enters quantum channel. The similarity of the results
of our analyses of both of these two situations strongly sug-
gest that it can be valid for any type of channel noise. On the
other hand, in the case of the scheme with SPDC-based sig-
nal source, analyzed in Sec. III C, a similar asymptotic non-
Gaussianity criterion, given by the expression (64), can be
used to bound the secure region of the parameters T and µ,
but in the general case the formula for the minimal secure T
cannot be derived analytically. This quantity can be found
numerically by solving the equation (68) with the functions
y(T ) and Q(T ) given by (69) and (70) respectively. Only for
the extreme situations when ν ≪ d or d ≪ ν simple ana-
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FIG. 9. (color online) Comparison between the lower bounds for
the security of BB84 protocol (solid lines) realized using the scheme
presented in Fig.2 and the respective criteria for non-Gaussianity of
light reaching Bob’s detection system (dotted lines), calculated nu-
merically for p = 1 and e = 0 for the case when his autocorrelation
function measurement is performed with the same noisy and untrusty
single-photon detectors that are used for him for the key generation
process with the probability of registering a dark count d = 0 (red,
uppermost lines), d = 10−5 (green, middlemost lines) and d = 10−3
(blue, lowermost lines). The corresponding criterion for the nonclas-
sicality of light arriving at Bob’s side (independent of the value of d)
is drawn with black, dashed line.
lytical formulas for the minimal secure transmittance of the
channel connecting Alice and Bob, given by the expressions
(71) and (74), can be found.
The results of our work show that in many situations
checking non-Gaussianity of light arriving at Bob’s detec-
tion system is feasible for prior assessment of the security
of prepare-and-measure DV QKD systems for all elements
of the tranmission link. In regime when polarization noise
and dark-count rate of the detectors are small, quantum non-
Gaussianity becomes a relevant partial condition on the out-
put quantum statistics of single-mode light, which, differently
to nonclassicality, sufficiently predicts the security of a DV
QKD protocol once it is implemented over the given noisy
quantum channel. This conclusion remains valid even for
single-photon sources with non-unity probability of emission.
However, the full verification of security requires further es-
timation of other parameters of the protocol, relevant for the
security (in particular the level of QBER and the probability
for Bob’s measurement system to register a click when Alice’s
source emits a signal). It is possible that other directly mea-
surable characteristics could be defined, which together with
non-Gaussianity would form a full set of completely sufficient
security indicators. However, a problem of finding such a set
remains open for further research.
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Appendix A
The whole analysis presented in the main body of this arti-
cle was performed with the assumption that Bob uses perfect
single-photon detectors for his autocorrelation function mea-
surements, needed for the verification of nonclassicality and
non-Gaussianity of light arriving at his side. This scenario
was adopted by us primarily because we wanted to check how
QKD security criterion can be related to the genuine quantum
features of the signal pulses reaching Bob, undisturbed by the
potential imperfection of the realistic process of single-photon
detection. However, in the most unfavorable situation from
Bob’s point of view his detectors can be noisy and untrusted,
meaning that all of the errors generated by the dark counts
during the process of autocorrelation function measurement
have to be treated as imperfections of the detected signal.
To check how the relationship between QKD security crite-
rion and the criteria for nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity of
light arriving at Bob’s side would change if we chose this pes-
simistic assumption for our analysis, we repeated the calcula-
tions performed in Sec. IIIA for the QKD model with thermal
bath in the case when Bob uses exactly the same detectors
for his nonclassicality and non-Gaussianity measurements as
for the generation of cryptographic key (i.e. with the same
dark count probability per gate). The results of this analysis,
presented in Fig. 9, indicate that in this particular situation a
given QKD scheme is always secure for T ≪ 1 if only the
raw results of the autocorrelation function measurement (i.e.
the results read out directly from the detectors without any
correction for the expected contribution from the dark counts)
indicate non-Gaussianity of the signal states reaching Bob, re-
gardless of the value of d.
Appendix B
To check how changes of the statistics of photons emit-
ted by a given source of noise may influence the relationship
between QKD security and non-Gaussianity criteria for the
DV QKD model with the noise coupling to the signal before
the entrance to the quantum channel, illustrated in Fig. 4, we
performed numerical calculations for this setup configuration
both for the case of Poisson and thermal types of the afore-
mentioned statistics. The comparison of the obtained results
can be seen in Fig. 10.
The main conclusion that can be derived from this picture
is that while for high values of T non-Gaussianity criterion is
more restrictive in the case of thermal statistics, QKD security
criterion turns out to be more relaxed in this situation. As a
result of this, when the source of noise has Poisson statistics
non-Gaussianity criterion is not sufficient for the QKD secu-
rity for significantly broader range of high transmittance of the
channel connecting Alice and Bob than in the thermal case. In
fact, it may even be not sufficient when e = 0 if T ≈ 1, as can
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FIG. 10. (color online) Comparison between the lower bounds for
the security of BB84 protocol realized with the use of the scheme
presented in Fig. 4 and the corresponding non-Gaussianity criteria
(brown lines, lowermost when T ≪ 1) for the light arriving at Bob’s
side, found numerically for the cases when the source of noise has
thermal (solid lines) or Poisson (dashed lines) statistics of the number
of photons emitted per pulse. All the calculations were performed
for p = 1 and e = 0. The QKD security criteria were found for
two different values of the probability of registering a dark count in
Bob’s detectors per gate: d = 0 (red lines, uppermost when T ≪ 1)
and d = 10−3 (blue lines, middlemost when T ≪ 1).
be seen in Fig. 10. However, the difference between the re-
sults of our calculations obtained for the cases of thermal and
Poisson statistics of the source of noise quickly vanishes with
the lowering T and becomes unnoticeable when T < 10−1.
It means that in the situations when the distance between Al-
ice and Bob is long, the type of the statistics of the source of
noise is not important from the perspective of security of the
DV QKD model pictured in Fig. 4.
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